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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Municipal debt finance has become the focus of considerable attention and controversy at the federal, state and local
levels in recent years. Fiscal mismanagement, the tax revolt
and, most recently, the unprecedented downturn in the bond
market have sent shock waves through the municipal securities industry, having an impact on the manner of debt financing for virtually all state and local governments. This article
provides an overview of municipal debt finance and identifies
emerging trends, analyzes Wisconsin's basic general obligation
and revenue bond vehicles, suggests improvements to facilitate debt financing in the 1980's, and discusses the implication of the growing federal impact on local government debt
management.
The 1970's was a decade of turbulence, change and new
dimensions for municipal debt finance. The New York City
crisis and subsequent events in Cleveland, Wayne County
(Detroit), Philadelphia and the Chicago City School District
required extraordinary local, state and federal undertakings to
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avoid or minimize defaults on outstanding obligations. These
episodes reinforced attempts at the federal level, to date unsuccessful, to subject municipal securities to the rigorous disclosure requirements of the federal securities law."
The "tax revolt" climate of the 1970's brought the property tax, the underpinning of conventional general obligation
debt finance, under severe criticism. The celebrated passage of
Proposition 13 in California, probably more than any other
single event, epitomized a national mood against increasing
tax burdens. The result has been that local governments have
found it increasingly difficult to utilize debt vehicles supported by property taxes.
The collapse of the bond market in early 1980 had and will
continue to have a devastating effect on municipalities and
taxpayers.2 Steadily increasing inflation and the Federal Reserve Board's policy of pursuing monetary restraint by raising
interest rates created an uncertain financial environment. The
bond market, which had provided a dependable, predictable
and stable source of funds for local governments, was at an
unprecedented low. As a consequence, municipalities were
forced to postpone, restructure or cancel their planned
offerings.
Amidst all this turbulence, municipal debt finance has
managed to take on new dimensions, particularly in the area
of limited obligation or revenue bond securities. The expansion of these so-called nonguaranteed securities has been attributed to several factors including a liberalization of the
"public purpose" doctrine, restrictions on general obligation
debt and a broader definition of securities recognized as being
1. For a discussion of disclosure with respect to municipal securities, see Doty,
Municipal Disclosure-Recent Developments, 9 UR. LAw. No. 2, vii (1977). Comment, The SEC Staff Report: Will Alleged Misconduct FinallyLead to FederalRegulation of Municipal Securities?12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 930 (1978); Comment, Federal
Regulation of Municipal Securities:Disclosure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty,
86 YALE L.J. 919 (1977). Self-imposed disclosure guidelines also have been promulgated. See MUNIcIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR
STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS (1979). See also Peterson, Doty, Forbes & Bourque,
Searchingfor Standards:Disclosure in the Municipal Securities Market, 1976 DUKE

L.J. 1177.
2. See Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 6, for a discussion of the collapse of the

bond market.
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those of governmental entities.3 A particularly good example
of this new dimension in municipal debt finance is the industrial development revenue bond. By defining the need to attract and retain industrial development as a public purpose,
many states, including Wisconsin,4 have authorized municipalities to issue industrial development revenue bonds to
finance development as a means of accomplishing the public
purpose.
The use of more sophisticated municipal debt financing
vehicles is indicative of a new aggressive posture that municipalities are taking in formulating economic development
strategies designed to influence the make-up of jobs, industry
and commerce in their communities - a role which has traditionally been left to the private sector while the public sector
concerned itself with the provision of services.5 This new public/private partnership is designed to make the most effective
use of public funds to maximize private investment in the local community.6 This phenomenon is illustrative of the expansion of government into areas formerly within the purview of
the private sector. This expansion has been identified as one
'7
of the "key intergovernmental trends of the past 20 years."
The source of public funds in this new partnership is likely
to be a combination of local debt financing and federal grants.
The local debt financing element could take many forms including general obligation borrowing, traditional revenue bond
financing, and more sophisticated types of debt financing such
as tax increment financing8 and industrial development revenue bonds. Perhaps the best example of federal grant money
is the relatively new Urban Development Action Grant program,9 the principal thrust of which is to use federal dollars as
3. Peterson, Current Research in State and Local Government Debt Policy and
Management (pt. 2), GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE, March-June, 1979, at 45.
4. See Wis. STAT. § 66.521 (1977).
5. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Executive Summary) (March, 1978).

COORDINATED URBAN

6. Id.
7. Daily Bond Buyer, Mar. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (reporting on a survey of professional staff members on the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).
8.See Wis. STAT. § 66.46 (1977). For an explanation of the mechanics of tax increment financing see Tax Incremental Financing,WIscONsIN TAXPAYER, April, 1978, at
1.
9. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, §
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"seed money" to encourage private investment in
municipalities. 10
The emergence of the public/private partnership dimension and the tax revolt of the late 1970's have been identified
as instrumental in a trend which has seen a substantial movement in the municipal bond market from general obligation
debt to revenue bond financing." It is expected that the trend
will continue through the 1980's. 2 This trend will be due not
only to the continued use of more sophisticated revenue bond
vehicles for purposes such as public power, housing, and industrial development, but also to the more frequent use of
revenue bonds for projects often financed by general obligation debt such as water and sewer systems, solid waste handling and resource recovery systems. 3
Without attempting to minimize the significance of the
trend toward expanded use of revenue bond financing, it is
important to view the trend in its proper perspective. The
financing vehicle, be it revenue or general obligation, is simply
a means of accomplishing the greater objective of maintaining
and preserving a community's capital structure. It is not uncommon for capital programs to be the first to suffer from
budget reductions by communities. A decrease in capital investment is one factor which urban analysts have identified as
a manifestation of fiscal distress. 4 While politically and economically appealing, a decrease in governmental investment
can cause out-migration and discourage private investment. 5
To avoid these consequences, municipalities must continue to
make use of public credit, whether through general obligation,
revenue bonds or alternative types of financing.'
110(b), 91 Stat. 1125, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5318 (1980)).
10. Ellison, The Urban Development Action Program: Using Federal Funds to
Leverage Private Investment in Distressed Communities, 11 URB. LAw. 424 (1979).
11. See Daily Bond Buyer, Nov. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 3 (summarizing a research
report by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.).
12. Id.
3. Id.
14. Merget, The Era of Fiscal Restraint, 11 URB. DATA SERvIcE REP. 7 (Wash.,
D.C.: International City Management Ass'n; January, 1979).
15. Bagwell, Evans & Nielsen, The Municipal Bond Market: An Analysis and
Suggested Reform, 16 HARv. J. LEGIS. 211, 214 (1979).

16. A viable alternative beginning to emerge in municipal finance is tax-exempt
leasing. If structured properly it provides a means of acquiring assets without the
necessity of incurring debt, at a comparable cost. See Schickendantz, Financing
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Wisconsin municipalities will not escape the effects of
these events and trends. The capacity of the Wisconsin statutory framework to accomodate these trends, and the impact of
federal measures which reduce state and local debt issuance
flexibility, will be discussed below.
II.

GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS

Chapter 67 of the Wisconsin Statutes governs the issuance
of various municipal obligations commonly known as "general
obligation" bonds or notes. These obligations are defined as
debt instruments 17 which are payable from general revenues
of the issuing municipality, and which are backed by its "full
faith and credit" and taxing power."' The most common
source of revenue which secures the payment of the obligations is the ad valorem tax levied on all taxable property
within the limits of the issuer at the time of the issuance of
the obligations.1 9 These taxes are generally unlimited as to
rate or amount.20 General obligation bonds are a significant
Through Municipal Leasing, in 5 CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROB. 329 (P. Reaune ed.
1978-79).
17. The debt obligation is typically evidenced by a written instrument, in the
form of a bond, note or certificate acknowledging the debt and stating the terms of
the contract between borrower and lender. See W. SMITH, THE APPRAISAL OF MUNICIPAL CREDIT RISK 176 (1979), [hereinafter cited as SMITH]. The applicable statutory
definition is contained in WIs. STAT. § 67.01(2) (1977) which defines "municipal obligation" as "every lawful promise or engagement in writing by a municipality to pay at
a specified future time a specified sum of money."
18. See SMTrrH, supra note 17, at 180, which stated that in order for a bond to be a
general obligation it must possess two attributes: "First, it is the obligation of a governmental unit with the power to levy and collect taxes and is repayable, initially or
ultimately, from the general revenues; second, it is backed by a pledge of full faith
and credit of the issuer . . . ." See also G. CALVERT, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL
BONDS 3 (9th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FUNDAMENTALS]; Greenberg, Municipal
Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices,9 URS. LAW. 338, 340 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
19. Generally, sales and income tax revenues, or any other source of revenue, can
also be utilized. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 181. Wis. STAT. §§ 67.11(1)(c), (e)(1977)
provide that the sources of the sinking fund to pay principal and interest on a particular bond issue can include "[s]uch moneys, derived from licenses or other sources
... as the governing body may elect to carry into the sinking fund," and "[s]uch
further sums, raised by taxation annually, or from time to time, as may be necessary
to make the contributions to the fund .... "
20. The general obligation character of an instrument is not invalidated by a tax
rate limit applicable to taxes for debt service. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 181. See
also FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 3. This question is rendered moot in most instances under WIs. STAT. § 67.035 (1977), which states that tax limitations do not
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source of municipal credit and usually are issued to finance
non-revenue generating long-term capital improvements
which are not cash financed (i.e., not included in the current
budget). In Wisconsin, the power to borrow money and issue
general obligations is limited by a number of interrelated constitutional and statutory provisions.
Article XI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution imposes a general percentage limitation on the power of a municipality to become indebted,2 1 and also requires that, before
or at the time of incurring any indebtedness, the municipality
provide for the collection of a direct annual irrepealable tax to
pay principal of and interest on the entire debt.22 These constitutional proscriptions developed to curb abuses, 23 restrain
apply to taxes levied "for the purpose of paying principal and interest on valid bonds
or notes now or hereafter outstanding ....
"
21. The section provides in pertinent part,
No county, city, town, village, school district or other municipal corporation
may become indebted in an amount that exceeds an allowable percentage of
the taxable property located therein equalized for state purposes as provided
by the legislature. In all cases the allowable percentage shall be five per centum
except as follows: (a) For any city authorized to issue bonds for school purposes, an additional ten per centum shall be permitted for school purposes
only, and in such cases the territory attached to the city for school purposes
shall be included in the total taxable property supporting the bonds issued for
school purposes. (b) For any school district which offers no less than grades
one to twelve and which at the time of incurring such debt is eligible for the
highest level of school aids, ten per centum shall be permitted.
WIS. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.

22. The section provides:
Any county, city, town, village, school district or other municipal corporation
incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid, shall before or at the time of doing so,
provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest
on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal
thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same; except that
when such indebtedness is incurred in the acquisition of lands by cities, or by
counties having a population of one hundred fifty thousand or over, for public,
municipal purposes, or for the permanent improvement thereof, the city or
county incurring the same shall, before or at the time of so doing, provide for
the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such debt
as it falls due ....
WIs. CONsT. art. XI, § 3 (emphasis added). The unique feature of this provision is
that the tax must be levied at the time the debt is incurred for each year the debt will
be outstanding thereby binding future governments.
23. For a thorough discussion of the development of the constitutional debt limitation in Wisconsin, see Kiernan, Wisconsin Municipal Indebtedness: Part 1-The
Power to Become Indebted and Its Limits, 1964 Wis. L. Rav. 173, 185-95 [hereinafter
cited as Kiernan]. See also Comment, ConstitutionalDebt Limitations of Wisconsin
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indebtedness and, thereby, limit taxes and maintain local government solvency.
The sections that follow will discuss the history, legislative
developments and current application of the specific limitations on municipal borrowing imposed by chapter 67 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. Changes will be recommended to enable
Wisconsin municipalities to use credit more effectively to
meet expanding public service responsibilities and to maintain
capital resources in a changing debt market. 24 Although general obligation financing no longer dominates municipal borrowing, 25 it is the traditional and often the most appropriate
method of paying the cost of non-revenue generating capital
improvements for the basic tax-supported functions of local
government. In spite of the decreased reliance on general obligation financing, municipalities developing a debt policy
should be able to utilize both revenue and general obligation
financing as efficiently as possible. Wisconsin municipalities
are frustrated in developing a flexible, responsible debt policy
by the limited purposes and complicated procedures currently
imposed by chapter 67.
A. Limitations Imposed by Chapter 67 and
Recommendations for Change
Chapter 67 of the Wisconsin Statutes was created by chapter 576, Laws of 1921 and was intended to be a substitute for
every existing statute authorizing or regulating the borrowing
of money by municipalities or the issuing of municipal obligations.2 8 Prior to the codification of 1921, the statutory proviMunicipalities-A Survey, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 614, 614-16 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
ConstitutionalDebt Limitations]. For a historical discussion of the growth and type

of debt ceilings, see Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity
Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York
City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt and Beyond, 63

MINN.

L. REv. 545, 546-51

(1979) [hereinafter cited as Gelfand].
24. See note 2 supra.
25. See STANDIAw & PooR's RATINGS GumR 259-60 (1979); see also Petersen, Current Research in State and Local Government Debt Policy and Management, GovErrAL
FiNANc., November, 1978, at 35.
26. See Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 67.01, Revisor's Note (1930). See also Quarles, Mu-

nicipal Borrowing in Wisconsin, 12 MARQ. L. REv. 18 (1927) [hereinafter cited as
Quarles]. Various exceptions to the application to chapter 67 are set forth in Wis.
STAT. § 67.01 (8)(a)-(h) (1977) and include, inter alia, bonds issued pursuant to Wis.
STAT.

§

66.066 (1977). The issuance of bonds pursuant to WIs.

STAT.

§ 66.066 (1977) is
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sions relating to municipal financing through the issuance of
municipal bonds were scattered throughout the statutes.2
The drafters' purpose was to bring together the various borrowing statutes; to incorporate the material parts; and to
standardize the various policies and procedures by rephrasing,
revising and refining, the statutory language.2 8 Collecting
these provisions in chapter 67 undoubtedly simplified the borrowing procedure for municipalities and aided bond counsel in
determining the legality of the proceedings.2 9 However, since
the revision embodied the revailing cautious attitude toward
public indebtedness,3 0 it did little to expand the borrowing capabilities of municipalities. In fact, whether purposefully or
inadvertently, the revision may have restricted the borrowing
power even further by failing to include a section which allowed cities and villages to borrow "to accomplish any other
purpose in [their] lawful power."3' 1 The result is a statutory
discussed at length at Part II, infra.
27. In 1919, for example, bond issuance provisions were found in statute sections
relating to the specific form of municipality (see, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 59.90 (1919)
(county bond provisions); ch. 64c § 926-11 (1919) (special charter city bond provisions); § 60.18 (1919) (town bonds)); and the particular type of project (see, e.g., Wis.
STAT. ch. 64c, §§ 1317m-12,-13 (1919) (highway and bridge bonds); § 27.10(2) (1919)
(bonds for public parks)), as well as in the constitution.
28. See Quarles, supra note 26, at 18.
29. Bond counsel must render an approving legal opinion which generally states
that the municipality has statutory authority to incur debt for the specific purpose,
that it has followed proper procedures in doing so, that the obligations are in proper
form, that the obligations are valid and legally binding, that the borrowing does not
exceed the prescribed debt limitation, that a tax sufficient to pay principal and interest on the obligations has been levied, and finally, that the interest paid will be exempt from present federal income taxes. See FUNDAmENTALS, supra note 18, at 12132.
30. See Gelfand, supranote 23, at 546-51; Kiernan, supra note 23, at 186-92. This
aversion to public debt was articulated early in the country's history by Thomas
Jefferson:
The principle of spending money to be paid by posterity, under the name of
funding, is but swindling futurity on a large scale ... [Wie must not let our
rulers load us with perpetual debt ... I place economy among the first and
most important of republican virtues, and public debt as the greatest of all
dangers to be feared.
Quoted in 15 E. McQUI.LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPOaRiONS § 41.02(3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as McQUmwN].

31. Wis. STAT. ch. 64ce, § 942 (repealed in 1921) provided that:
Any city or village may also borrow money and issue its negotiable bonds for
any of the following purposes, viz.: The purchase or erection of public buildings; the purchase of fire engines or any apparatus for the extinguishment of
fires;.. . or to accomplish any other purpose in the lawful power of such
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scheme which imposes unnecessary restrictions upon municipalities. Certainly the statutory scheme limits the flexibility of
Wisconsin municipalities to borrow for their growing and
changing needs in an uncertain financial environment.
1.

Purpose Restrictions
Although the provisions of article XI, section 3 were specifically enacted in 1874 to restrict municipal indebtedness, 82
the legislature did not allow these constitutional debt limitations to act as the only restraint on municipal borrowing.
When chapter 67 was created, various purpose provisions
throughout the general statutes were compiled in section
67.04.1' Prior to the enactment, the general rule, which had
been relied on by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in its decisions, was that municipalities could borrow money for all lawful municipal purposes. 4 The specific purpose statutes probacorporation.

(emphasis added).
32. Prior to 1874, the provision contained in art. XI, § 3 directed the legislature
"to provide for organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their
power of. . . borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to
prevent abuses is [sic] assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such
municipal corporations." (emphasis added). While the enacted provision imposed no
express limit on municipal borrowing, an earlier draft of the constitution read: "No
municipal corporation shall have the power to contract debts on account of said corporation for any purpose whatsoever." JOURNAL OF THE [1846] CONSTITUTIONAL CON-'

(1847), at 133. In spite of the constitution's clear mandate to the legislature
to restrain public borrowing, the legislature failed to act. As a result, local governments proceeded to incur vast quantities of debt. Consequently, in 1874, art. XI, § 3
was amended to attempt to remedy the situation. See Kiernan, supra note 23, at 18590; ConstitutionalDebt Limitations, supra note 23, at 614-15.
33. See Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 67.04; Revisor's Note (1930).
34. See, e.g., Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 493, 510-11 [*470, *491-92] (1860), where
the court said:
But it is claimed that the city had no power to make this loan, or issue its
bonds therefor. There is no special act and no provision in its charter expressly
authorizing it, and it was said that without this the power to borrow money did
not exist, and could not be claimed as incidental to the execution of the general powers granted by the charter. The charter does confer the power to
purchase fire apparatus, cemetery grounds, etc., to establish markets, and to do
many other things, for the execution of which, money would be necessary as a
means. It would seem, therefore, that in the absence of any restriction, the
power to borrow money would pass as an incident to the execution of these
general powers, according to the well settled rule that corporations may resort
to the usual and convenient means of executing the powers granted; for certainly no means is more usual for the execution of such objects, than that of
borrowing money.
VENTION
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bly were, in their original contexts, grants of power to borrow
for other than what were then viewed as conventional municipal purposes.3 5 However, when these statutory sections were
codified in section 67.04, and prefaced by the proscriptive language of section 67.03, which states that "municipalities may
borrow money and issue municipal obligations therefore only
for the purposes. . . specified in this chapter, 3 6 the enumerated purposes became regarded as the exclusive grants of borrowing power. Practically, however, this limited purpose enumeration has had little effect.
In response to various pressures and concerns, the legislature has frequently expanded and amended the purpose provisions of section 67.04.37 Such amendments have often followed the same pattern. When financing is proposed for a
questionable purpose, and neither bond counsel nor the Attorney General is willing to provide an unqualified opinion (because borrowing for the purpose is not expressly authorized by
section 67.04), the proponents are forced to seek remedial legislation. For example, in 1956, the Attorney General was
See also Miles v. City of Ashland, 172 Wis. 605, 179 N.W. 779 (1920) (street paving,
an extraordinary expense); Bennett v. Town of Nebagamon, 122 Wis. 295, 99 N.W.
1039 (1904) (waterworks); Ellinwood v. City of Reedsburg, 91 Wis. 131, 64 N.W. 885
(1895) (waterworks); Kilvington v. City of Superior, 83 Wis. 222, 53 N.W. 487 (1892)
(crematory); Hasbrouck v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 42 [*37] (1860) (harbor, an
extraordinary municipal purpose); State ex rel. Dean v. Common Council, 7 Wis. 582
[*6881(1859) (cemetery, an ordinary municipal purpose).
35. Mills suggests that the practice when a municipality needed to borrow money
for a purpose not expressly granted by its charter was to prevail upon the legislature
for an express grant of power. The court said:
When, therefore, the charter does not expressly give the power of borrowing
money, even though it grants power to which this might be claimed as incident,
yet there is room for doubt, a chance for an argument, and that being so, it
might, as a matter of policy, facilitate the loan by removing all uncertainty by
an express act of the legislature. And the fact that such acts have been passed,
being then clearly necessary, when these corporations have been authorized to
issue bonds in aid of purposes outside of their charters, may have had a tendency to induce a resort to the same practice when the bonds were issued for
some purpose authorized by the charter, though in that case such legislation
may not have been necessary.
11 Wis. at 511, [*492].
36. Wis. STAT. § 67.03(1) (1977) (emphasis added). See Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 67.03,
Revisor's Note (1930).
37. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 67.04, History and Source of Law (West 1965), indicating that there have been no fewer than one hundred changes in the purpose provisions found in that section.
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asked whether counties could use general obligation bonds to
pay the cost of a parking facility.38 He concluded that a parking structure was not a "county building" so as to bring it
within the purview of section 67.04(1)(a) and thus could not
be financed by general obligation county bonds.3 9 Subsequently section 67.04(1)(x) was enacted 40 to specifically allow

counties to borrow money and issue obligations "[t]o acquire
sites for parking lots and to construct buildings and other
equipment and appurtenances necessary for operation and
maintenance of the same." ' The practical result is that section 67.04 does not actually limit municipal borrowing for
projects having some arguably legitimate public purpose but
merely delays it, causing unwarranted waste of municipal and
legislative energies.42
Municipalities should be granted the power to borrow
money to perform any public purpose rather than being limited to the patchwork of purposes found in section 67.04.' s
Generally, a public purpose has for its objective the promotion of public health, education, safety, welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all, or at least a significant number,
of the residents." The definition of public purpose is an expanding one which has received a steadily widening interpretation with the growth of urbanism and community social
responsibility.
Municipal improvements financed by public indebtedness
may be made for a clearly governmental purpose, a public ser38. 45 Op. Att'y Gen. 204 (Wis. 1956).
39. Id. at 206-07.
40. 1957 Wis. Laws ch. 17.
41. Wis. STAT. § 67.04(1)(x) (1977).
42. See Kiernan, Kubale & Bugge, Wisconsin Municipal Indebtedness: Conclusions and Recommendations, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 604, 616 [hereinafter cited as
Kiernan et al.]:
[T]hese statutes [granting the power to borrow] are incomplete and ineffective.
Moreover they are hopelessly redundant and prolix and bristle with unfortunate construction problems. Their unfortunate effect is to frustrate socially desirable goals, to engender bad precedents by encouraging broad judicial construction and to inflict shocking injustice on good-faith creditors.
(footnotes omitted).
43. Accord, Kiernan, supra note 23, at 183, Kiernan et al, supra note 41, at 616,

Quarles, supra note 26, at 23.
44. See McQuiLLIN, supra note 30, at § 39.19 (3d ed. 1970).
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vice enterprise, or a quasi-public purpose. 45 The various types
of public purposes are represented by items specifically enumerated in section 67.04.46 This list, however, imposes the
practical limitations discussed above. Ideally, section 67.04
should simply state that public purpose is the sole criterion
for municipal borrowing. A less sweeping, but equally effective, solution would be to incorporate the concept into the
statute. The introductory language of section 67.04 could be
amended to read, in pertinent part: "municipalities are empowered to borrow money,. . . for the purposes enumerated in
this section or any other public purpose." As changed, the
enumerated purposes would be illustrative, rather than exclusive. This change would allow municipalities to meet new
challenges, developments and conditions without constant resort to the legislature.
Establishing "public purpose" as the primary restriction
on municipal borrowing would eliminate the various techniques used to circumvent the limitations imposed by a section 67.04. Municipalities would no longer be forced to wait
for enabling legislation or to resort to other sections of the
statutes to borrow money for necessary projects. Eliminating
the restrictive character of the enumerated purposes would
not lead to abusive borrowing. Constitutional and statutory
restraints such as the quantitative debt limit and mandatory
tax levy would remain as practical and functional limits on
municipal borrowing. 47 While the public purpose criterion
would place a greater burden on bond counsel who would have
to make threshold determinations, there is ample precedent .to
assist in characterizing a particular undertaking. 8 In the final
45. See Smith, supra note 17, at 177-79. Smith states that included in the first
category are various improvements either undertaken to directly discharge a public
function or devoted exclusively to governmental purposes. These projects include
schools, fire stations, city halls, courthouses, streets and roads. The second category
includes water, sewer, transportation and other utility systems. The third category
includes projects such as housing, hospitals, recreational facilities and industrial developments. With changing social, political and economic conditions, these activities
have increasingly become functions and responsibilities of the public sector.
46. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 67.04(1)(a), 67.04(1)(aa), 67.04(2)(j), 67.04(2)(zn)
(1977).
47. See Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1977).
48. For an illustrative list of public purpose borrowings, see MCQUILLIN, supra
note 30, at § 43.31.
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analysis the courts would be left to determine the outer limits
of public purpose.
2.

Limitation by Type of Obligation
General obligation borrowing is further limited by the type
of obligation which the municipality may issue to evidence the
borrowing. Chapter 67 provides for borrowing through issuance of bonds 49 and promissory notes, 50 including various tax
anticipation notes, 51 school orders, 52 and other instruments se-

cured by tax sale certificates.5 Each of these obligations has
designated purposes and a specific maximum term. 4 The
short-term uses of the various temporary borrowing vehicles
are appropriate for their purposes. Long-term promissory
notes, however, have been used inappropriately in certain circumstances. Their ability to be privately negotiated, the absence of mandatory referendum requirements and the broader
range of purposes for which they can be used,55 cause issuers
to utilize a ten-year note for one or all of the foregoing reasons
when a bond issue may be more appropriate. In structuring
debt policy, municipalities need flexibility to avoid erratic
fluctuations in tax levy and to retire debt in a systematic
manner while meeting operating, capital and emergency requirements continuously, effectively and on a timely basis. A
statutory scheme which encourages issuers to choose debt vehicles and to compress maturity schedules for artificial rea49. Wis.

STAT. §§ 67.04, 67.13 (1977).
50. Wis. STAT. § 67.12 (1977).
51. Wis. STAT. §§ 67.12(6), 67.12(13), 67.125 (1977).
52. Wis. STAT. § 67.12(8) (1977).
53. WIs. STAT. § 67.12(9) (1977).
54. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 67.12(13) (permitting a county to borrow money by
issuing promissory notes for a period of less than six months for payment of current
and ordinary expenses or of valid obligations previously issued by the county in anticipation of receipt of taxes collected but not remitted to the county treasurer); Wis.
STAT. § 67.12(8) (authorizing school districts to borrow money by issuing school orders, which may not extend beyond November 1 of the following year, to meet the
immediate expenses of maintaining public instruction in anticipation of receipt of
property taxes and other revenues).
55. See Wis. STAT. § 67.12(12) (1977). The section does not expressly require public sale or prohibit private negotiated sales of promissory notes. This has led bond
counsel to the opinion that private negotiated sales are permissible under § 67.12(12).
A permissive referendum procedure is provided but it only applies to school districts.
Moreover, the general nature of the purpose language indicates that promissory notes
may be issued for more purposes than bonds.
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553

sons must be reconsidered. Municipalities should have
broadened flexibility to select the appropriate vehicle and to
establish maturities based on market and fiscal
considerations.5"
Furthermore, one type of obligation commonly available
under other state statutory schemes,57 the bond anticipation
note (BAN), should be authorized in Wisconsin. The BAN is a
short-term loan intended to be repayable from proceeds of the
sale of bonds, which constitute the permanent financing. 58 A
municipality issues temporary notes in anticipation of future
bond revenues for limited periods after the bonds are authorized but before they are issued. By using a BAN, the municipality obtains the funds needed to commence a project prior
to the scheduled bond issue. This provides substantial flexibility to local governments. Under volatile market conditions,
the principal attraction of a BAN issue is that it enables municipalities to finance and commence capital projects on
schedule when long-term rates are prohibitively high while
waiting to borrow the balance and to refinance the short-term
debt at long-term rates after long-term rates drop. 9
Wisconsin municipalities have resorted to an awkward
two-step procedure to simulate the BAN process. In order to
56. See L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN LOCAL GOVERN245-327 (1975), which provides a general discussion regarding the importance of determining the most suitable means of borrowing to develop a responsible debt management program.
57. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53 § 6780-158(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981) which
provides:
If deemed desirable, the governing body may evidence all or part of any
electoral or nonelectoral debt by the issue of a series of bond anticipation
notes. Such notes shall be payable by exchange for, or out of the proceeds of,
the sale of a designated series of bonds referred to in the bond anticipation
notes. The reference to the bonds shall specify a maximum rate of interest to
be borne by the series of bonds and provide that the series shall be offered for
sale but if no proposals shall be received, the sole remedy of the holders of the
bond anticipation notes shall be either to accept the bonds at the specified
maximum interest rate, or to extend the maturity of the bond anticipation
notes for one or more specified additional periods of not less than six months
each during which additional offers of the bonds may be made.
58. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 348.
59. SMITH, supra note 17, at 220, suggests that BANs be used to issue debt in
increments as work on a large project progresses. He maintains that this might result
in a lower interest rate than if the entire issue was marketed at once. He also states
that the incremental financing permits issuance of no larger an authorization than is
actually necessary to complete construction. This suggestion is another use of BANs.
MENT FINANCE
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obtain short-term money to begin a project, a municipality
must authorize and issue a general obligation promissory note
pursuant to section 67.12(12).. This could be accomplished either with a short call feature, which often makes it less marketable, or with a short maturity, which then forces the municipality to levy a disproportionately large tax for the term of
the note. When the longer term bonds are issued, the temporary notes are either called for prepayment or are refunded.
This is an artificial proceeding which is difficult to arrange
and execute. BAN authority would enable the issuer to
achieve the same result in a simple, straightforward manner.
Various types of obligations should be accessible to municipalities to allow them to plan and manage their debt and
to use their power to borrow in the most judicious and effective manner. The types of obligations available under chapter
67 should provide options rather than impose limits on
municipal financing. Bond anticipation notes should be available to allow even greater flexibility in planning and executing
a borrowing program.
3.

Procedural Limitations

Procedures which must be followed when a municipality
borrows money and issues obligations are set forth in detail in
chapter 67.60 Different means are provided for different types
of local governments,6 1 for different types of borrowing, 2 and,
within the same type, for different purposes.6 3 These prescribed procedures unnecessarily restrain and complicate
borrowing.
Chief among the limiting procedures are the referendum
provisions. For no apparent reason," there exists a myriad of

60. Wis. STAT. § 67.05 (1977).
61. Compare Wis. STAT. § 67.05 (4) with § 67.05 (5) (1977), and Wis. STAT. § 67.05
(6) with § 67.05 (6a) (1977).
62. Compare Wis. STAT. § 67.05 with § 67.12 (1977).
63. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 67.05 (5)(b) (1977).
64. Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 67.05 (4), Revisor's Note (1930) states a practical justification for limiting county referendum elections:
Subsection (4) provides for special elections to ratify initial resolutions
adopted by county boards. It expressly enumerates the cases in which such
elections must be called. There are only a few of these found in the statutes. In
most cases county boards decide without referendum whether county bonds
shall issue, probably because county elections are expensive.
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distinctions in referendum requirements by type of municipality, purpose and obligation.15 Referenda are expensive and entail a great deal of delay. Often the marketability of the issue
is impaired by the uncertainty involved in either waiting for
the outcome of a referendum or waiting to see if a referendum
will be forced by petition of the electors. Sometimes local governments which should borrow by issuing long-term bonds
borrow by issuing promissory notes to avoid the referendum
requirements for bond issues.6 " This can cause an unnecessarily large tax burden which could be alleviated by amortizing
the debt over the longer period permitted by a bond issue.
Since there is no apparent justification for the distinctions in
referendum requirements, these distinctions should be eliminated and a uniform, permissive referendum procedure should

be instituted.
Despite countervailing public policy considerations, the expense, uncertainty and delay involved in mandatory referendum requirements are not justified. The stringent notice and
open meeting requirements 67 which apply when indebtedness
is authorized and taxes are levied, as well as the provisions

(emphasis added).
Referendum elections are quite expensive at all levels of government. The same pragmatic considerations which compelled the drafters to limit referendum elections in
counties should influence the legislature to eliminate all mandatory referendum
provisions.
65. For example, under Wis. STAT. § 67.05(4) (1977) county bonds do not need
approval by referendum except when issued for one of the purposes which specifically
calls for a referendum or which indicates that a referendum is permissive. By contrast, under § 67.05(5), city bonds must be submitted to a popular referendum unless
for one of the many exempted purposes found under § 67.05(5)(b). Even if the city's
bonds are exempted from referendum by that section, the city electors may compel a
referendum by filing a proper petition under § 67.05(7)(b). Also, § 67.05(7)(b) indicates that a city's governing body may submit the question to referendum on their
own initiative. Village referendum provisions are similar to those for cities. All town
bonds must be approved by electors pursuant to § 67.05(5)(a). School district bonds
issued pursuant to § 67.05(6a), whether initially authorized by the board or by the
electors, must be submitted to the electors for approval at a special or municipal
election. See generally Wis. STAT. § 67.05(4)-(7) (1977). See also Wis. STAT. §§
67.04(6), (7), (11), (12) (1977).
66. See Wis. STAT. § 67.05(14) (1977). Although Wis. STAT. § 67.05(14) states that
a referendum is not required for temporary borrowing under Wis. STAT. § 67.12, there
are provisions'for referendum when proper petitions have been filed. See Wis. STAT. §
67.12 (12) (1977).
67. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 67.05(3); 67.12(12)(e)2, 4 and §§ 19.81-.98 (1977).
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permitting a stay of bonding by protest,"s provide an opportunity for electors to be heard on and ultimately to veto municipal borrowing. In light of these procedural protections, the added protection which a mandatory referendum may provide is
insignificant when compared to the resulting cost, inconvenience and delay. Moreover, the political process itself provides practical protection from abusive borrowing practices.
Local governing bodies are subject to intense public scrutiny
and local elected officials must answer regularly to voter
constituencies.
Therefore, the statutes should be amended to allow routine municipal borrowing to proceed without a mandatory referendum. In those instances where a referendum is either
mandatory or permissive under the existing law, electors
should only be allowed to initiate a referendum by petition
under a uniform procedure.6 9 After an initial resolution"0 is
adopted, recorded and published by the governing body, the
electors should have fifteen days to file a petition in the office
of the municipal clerk requesting submission of the resolution
to the electors. If this petition is signed by electors numbering
at least twenty percent of the votes cast for governor in the
municipality in the last general election, the resolution would
not be effective unless then adopted by a majority of the electors voting on the referendum, either at a special election or
at the next scheduled municipal election. Also, the governing
body should be permitted the discretion to call a binding referendum.71 Clearly, referendum provisions should be unified

68. Wis. STAT. § 67.22 (1977).
69. The petition procedures now available are far from uniform. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. §§ 67.05(4), (7), 67.12(12)(e) (1977).
70. It is important that the petition period begin after the adoption of the initial
resolution and prior to the sale of bonds. Under Wis. STAT. § 67.12(12)(e), the waiting
period follows the authorization of the sale of the notes. This waiting period subjects
the note purchaser, who offers to pay market price for the notes, to the risks of a
changing market and a challenging electorate, and essentially prevents the purchaser
from re-selling in the interim. Consequently, a prospective purchaser may be reluctant to buy such an offering or may demand a higher price to compensate for the risk.
The promissory note procedure should be amended to have an initial resolution trigger the fifteen day petition period followed by the adoption of the resolution authorizing the sale of the notes. The final resolution would not be subject to a petition by
electors.
71. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 67.05(7) (1977). Certainly, local municipal officials
would be quite responsive to public sentiment regarding a proposed borrowing and
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and simplified permitting electors to express their approval
while giving the municipality the opportunity to borrow with
the least amount of expense, delay and uncertainty.
Another limiting procedure is the requirement mandating
public advertisement and competitive sale of all general obligation bond issues.7 2 This requirement often prevents municipalities from marketing their bonds in the most realistic, inexpensive and advantageous manner. Many times the guidance
provided by an underwriter in setting up an issue, as well as
the convenience provided by a negotiated sale, indicate that it
is the more practical method for some municipalities to sell
their bond issues.
The additional costs involved in a public sale are not justified for a small issuer which realistically does not expect to
receive a great number of bids. Furthermore, an issuer which
plans to offer a more complex issue can benefit from the earlier, closer relationship with the underwriter in a negotiated
sale. Generally, a municipality offering an issue which is unusually difficult to sell, due to the fact that money is tight,
that the municipality is unknown or that the issue is complex,
may find that better terms can be negotiated privately.7 8 Wisconsin municipalities have used promissory notes - even
when a longer term bond might have been more appropriate
to secure the advantages of a negotiated sale. 4 For these
reasons, Wisconsin bond issuers should have the option of
selling their obligations privately.
4.

Interest Rate and Quantity Limitations
Although at the time of codification the drafters attempted
to eliminate all interest rate limits,7 5 several sections of chapter 67 still prescribe the maximum rate of interest."" The market situation at the time of this writing clearly illustrates the
would call a referendum themselves if they became aware of strong opposition.
72. Wis. STAT. § 67.08(2) (1977).
73. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 360.
74. See Wis. STAT. § 67.12 (1977); see also note 55, supra.
75. See Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 67.12, Revisor's Note (1930), which states:
In framing this section, as in the preparation of the whole chapter, all
statutory fixing of rates of interest to be paid have been ignored. The rates now
prescribed are in hopeless confusion, have no goldenmean, are pretty ancient
and none of them really modern, and were never at any time really useful.
76. See Wis. STAT. §§ 67.12(8m), 67.12(9), 67.13, 67.156 (1977).
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impracticality and inefficiency of fixing statutory interest
rates. 77 Either municipalities are forced to attempt to market
an issue with an artificially imposed maximum interest rate
resulting, in many instances, in a no-bid situation, 78 or municipalities must, prior to the issuance of obligations, prevail
upon the legislature to repeal or amend the statutory rate.79
These are time-consuming procedures which, in a deteriorating market, can be quite costly as well. The wisdom of the
drafters of chapter 67 is apparent when they stated: "The
market rate is universally known or can easily be ascertained;
and borrowing municipalities can and will take better care of
themselves in fixing the rate than the legislature can take for
them."8 For these reasons, the remaining interest rate limits
should be removed from the statutes.
The legislature has also imposed, apparently at random,
various quantitative limitations8 1 which should be eliminated.
The general debt limitation provisions of the constitution8 2
are the only necessary restraint on municipal borrowing. Municipalities should have the discretion to borrow up to their
debt limit for any public purpose.
B.

Summary

The basic approach of the Wisconsin legislature toward
the subject of general obligation and other municipal indebtedness has been one of restraint and caution. As a consequence, the present statutory scheme has serious deficiencies
which prevent Wisconsin municipalities from fully utilizing
debt issuance authority to perform necessary and proper public functions.
Affirmative legislative action is needed to correct the statutory defects found in chapter 67. The present statutory
scheme should be restructured, revised and reformed to remove various anachronisms, to eliminate the limiting purpose

77. See text following note 2 supra regarding the volatile state of the municipal
securities market at the time of this writing.
78. See Daily Bond Buyer, April 1, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
79. See, e.g., 1979 Wis. Laws, ch. 221, § 457 (deleting the 7% interest rate ceiling
on promissory notes issued by Vocational, Technical and Adult Education Districts).
80. Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 67.12, Revisor's Note (1930).
81. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 67.04(1)(a), (1)(c), (2)(p), (6) (1977).
82. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1977).
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language and to clarify inconsistent, complicated procedures.
The relatively simple statutory changes proposed would
greatly facilitate local government borrowing.
83
III. MUNICIPAL REVENUE BONDS

Perhaps the most interesting anomaly of Wisconsin's revenue bond statute is the fact that it is devoid of any reference
to the term "revenue bond." Section 66.066 of the Wisconsin
Statutes permits several methods of payment for "purchasing,
acquiring, leasing, constructing, extending, adding to, improving, conducting, controlling, operating or managing a public
utility...." The most commonly used method of payment is
by the issuance of "mortgage bonds. '8 4 This term, however, is
rarely used by bond practitioners to refer to bonds issued pursuant to section 66.066. Rather, the preferred term is "revenue bonds."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has, at least on one occasion, chided counsel for referring to bonds issued pursuant to
section 66.066 as "revenue bonds." In Roberts v. City of
Madison85 the supreme court stated that bonds issued pursuant to section 66.066 of the Wisconsin Statutes were not revenue bonds but "straight mortgage bonds."8' 6 While the statement may be dismissed as an overly zealous adherence to
form over substance, nevertheless, it is indicative of a distinct
judicial attitude which has developed in Wisconsin with regard to the meaning of "indebtedness" as that term is used in
article XI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.8 7 The dis-

83. The discussion is limited to Wis. STAT. §§ 66.066 and 66.067 (1977). These
sections, particularly § 66.066, represent what may be called Wisconsin's "general
purpose" revenue bond vehicle. There are numerous other revenue bond vehicles
available for specific purposes, some of which are keyed back into § 66.066. See, e.g.,
Wis. STAT. §§ 66.51 (revenue bonds for counties and cities); 66.508 (county-city safety
buildings); 66.40 (housing authorities); 84.135 (interstate toll bridges); 66.94 (metro
transit authorities); 66.079 (city and village parking systems); 60.307 (town sanitary
districts); 120.19 (school building corporations); 66.076 (sewerage systems); 66.47
(county-city hospitals).
84. Wis. STAT. § 66.066 (1977) also provides for the issuance of mortgage certificates and shares of stock, neither of which are commonly used. Thus, this article
deals only with the mortgage bond vehicle.
85. 250 Wis. 317, 27 N.W.2d 233 (1947).
86. Id. at 324, 27 N.W.2d at 236. See also discussion at note 123, infra.
87. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3 sets forth the basic debt limitations imposed upon

Wisconsin municipalities. See notes 21 and 22, supra.
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cussion which follows analyzes the legislative and case law developments with respect to section 66.066, followed by a critique and suggestions for improving and updating the statute.
Furthermore, the potential for providing limited tax-supported revenue bonds will be analyzed.
A.

Legislative History and Case Law Development

Section 66.066 is part of a larger statute dealing with public utilities.8 The original statute, adopted in 1882,89 was
designed principally to authorize towns, villages and cities to
construct, acquire, maintain and operate utilities to provide
water, light, heat or power. The entry of local government into
such proprietary functions was due in part to municipal dissatisfaction with the service provided and to the inability of
private business to realize a sufficient return on investment so
as to make the enterprise economically viable. 0
The method of financing these public utilities had a rather
confusing history until 1919. However, in 1919 the Wisconsin
legislature enacted chapter 595 which, in large measure, was
the precursor to the present section 66.066. Chapter 595 authorized cities, villages and towns to provide for the payment
of purchasing, acquiring, constructing, extending, adding to or
improving public utilities, from the income and revenues of
such utilities. The income and revenue was required to be allocated to three accounts - operation and maintenance, depreciation, and redemption of principal and interest. The legislature, in an attempt to avoid the debt restrictions on
municipal debt embodied in article XI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, made the bonds payable only out of the
special redemption fund and required a statement to that effect on the face of the bonds along with the statement that
such bonds did not constitute an indebtedness of the municipality."" Two years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the "indebtedness" issue raised by chapter 595 in
92
State ex rel. Morgan v. City of Portage.
88. See Wis.

STAT. §§ 66.06-.078 (1977).
89. 1882 Wis. Laws ch. 325.
90. See Comment, Role of Local Government in Water Law, 1959 Wis. L. REv.
117, 188.
91. These requirements are now embodied in Wis. STAT. § 66.066(2)(a) (1977).
92. 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W. 376 (1921).

MUNICIPAL FINANCE

1980]

In Morgan, the City of Portage received an order from the
Railroad Commission directing the city to make improvements to its waterworks. Portage was close to its constitutional debt limit and it claimed that borrowing money to
make the improvements under the existing statutory scheme
relating to public utilities would constitute "debt" and cause
it to exceed the constitutional debt limit. The Railroad Commission contended that borrowing the money would not create
debt in the constitutional sense.
The supreme court analyzed the statute authorizing the issuance of bonds for public utilities and concluded that bonds
issued for the acquisition or construction of a public utility
would not create debt but that bonds issued for the extension
or improvement of an existing facility would create debt. The
court's rationale focused principally upon the fact that a statutory mortgage lien was automatically imposed upon the public utility facilities.93 According to the court, when bonds were
issued for acquisition or construction, the statutory mortgage
lien imposed was, in effect, a "purchase money mortgage."
In substance, the statute provides for the creation of a
purchase-money lien on the utility and the application of
the revenue it produces for the payment of the expense of
its operation, depreciation, and the cost of acquisition or
construction. The effect of the scheme is to subject the utlity to a purchase-money mortgage lien, which the city does
not assume to pay by resorting to its taxing power or to its
property or funds. The city assumes no financial obligation
94

Thus, the court concluded that the issuance of bonds pursuant to the statutory scheme for acquisition or construction
did not create debt since the only asset encumbered was the
asset being acquired or constructed, not previously owned municipal assets. Furthermore, neither the municipality's taxing
power nor existing funds were pledged to pay principal and
interest. However, the court concluded that bonds issued for
public utility improvements or extensions would create debt
since the statutory lien imposed would encumber an asset
93. The statutory lien provision is presently found in Wis.

(1977).
94. 174 Wis. 588, 591, 184 N.W. 376, 377 (1921).

STAT.

§ 66.066(2)(b)
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owned prior to the issuance of the bonds, (i.e., the existing
public utility property).9 5
It is manifest that after the utility property has been mortgaged to secure the purchase-money lien created in the manner provided by this statute, it cannot again be subjected to
a new mortgage lien for subsequent improvements, additions, and extensions, if such an indebtedness is in excess of
the constitutional limitation, because such a mortgage of the
utility property necessarily presupposes the creation of a
corporate liability of the municipality for whose payment
such security is given other than a purchase-money lien, and
would amount to mortgaging property of the municipality to
secure the payment of a corporate liability in the form of a
debt which did not rest on such property as a lien in the
nature of a purchase-money mortgage.96
In refusing to subscribe to the legislature's attempt to create a debt-free borrowing vehicle for public utility improvements or extensions, the supreme court in Morgan retained its
interpretation of the word "debt" within the context of article
XI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.9 7 This holding severely weakened the legislative financing scheme for public
utilities.
The public utility financing scheme remained in its weakened state for just over ten years until a constitutional
amendment was adopted in 1932 which, in effect, overruled
that portion of Morgan which held that bonds issued for pub95. The court made it clear, however, that bonds issued for improvements or extensions to be made concurrently with the acquisition or construction of a public
utility would not create debt.
It does not follow from this, however, that a city, town, or village may not, at
the time of acquiring an existing utility, undertake to improve it, or make additions or extensions thereto for the purpose of providing an efficient utility by
putting it in proper condition to render adequate service to the public, and
treat the cost thereof as part of the consideration of acquiring and constructing
the utility and provide for the payment of such cost out of the revenue derived
from its operation in the manner prescribed by sec. 927-16.
Id. at 594, 184 N.W. at 378.
96. Id. at 593-94, 184 N.W. at 378.
97. The supreme court has defined the word "debt" in the following terms: "It
means 'something owed', 'money due or to become due upon express or implied
agreement.'. . . It denotes not only an obligation of the debtor to pay, but the right
of the creditor to receive and enforce payment." Burnham v. City of Milwaukee, 98
Wis. 128, 132, 73 N.W. 1018, 1019 (1897) (citation omitted).
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lic utility improvements or extensions created debt.98 This socalled "public utility exception" to the creation of debt was
made available to towns, villages and cities in the 1932
amendment. Special districts were added by constitutional
amendment in 1966."9 A constitutional amendment to include
counties was defeated in 197&100

The precise meaning and scope of the public utility exception has been the subject of supreme court decisions on several occasions. In Payne v. City of Racine'0 1 the issue was

whether the term "public utility" included within its meaning
a sewage disposal system. The court ascribed a broad meaning
to the term and found that it did include a sewage disposal
system. The court held that a public utility "must be considered to include all plants or activities which the legislature
can reasonably classify as public utilities in the ordinary
meaning of the term. ' 10 2 In adopting this broad definition of
public utility, the court rejected the contention that the term
had an existing, more limited statutory meaning.103
98. The constitutional amendment added the following provision to art. XI, § 3
of the Wisconsin Constitution:
Providing, that an indebtedness created for the purpose of purchasing, acquiring, leasing, constructing, extending, adding to, improving, conducting, controlling, operating or managing a public utility of a town, village or city, and secured solely by the property or income of such public utility, and whereby no
municipal liability is created, shall not be considered an indebtedness of such
town, village or city, and shall not be included in arriving at such five per centurn debt limitation.
The only change in this provision since 1932 has been the addition in 1966 of "special
districts" to towns, villages and cities as entities to which this provision applies.
99. 1963 Jt. Res. 44, 1965 Jt. Res. 51 and 58, vote April 5, 1966.
100. 1971 Jt. Res. 32, 1973 Jt. Res. 133, vote April 1, 1975.
101. 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935).
102. Id. at 555, 259 N.W. at 439.
103. It was agreed that Wis. STAT. § 196.01(1) already set forth the definition of
public utility as including "any toll bridge or any plant or equipment or any part of a
plant or equipment, within the state, for the conveyance of telephone messages or for
the production, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, water or power
." In response the court, in pertinent part, stated that:
The term 'public utility,' as defined in sec. 196.01(1), Stats., means a person or
corporation which operates a utility, while in the constitutional amendment
(1932) it means the physical plant itself.
It is clear that the legislature has used the term 'public utility' in sec.
196.01, Stats., and the other terms referred to for the sake of convenience without intending in any way to restrict public utilities to the activities mentioned
in the definition.
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Thus, it appears that the supreme court will defer to any
reasonable legislative classification of public utilities. Chapter
479 of the Laws of 1933104 is one example of a reasonable legislative classification. Chapter 479 was adopted in response to
the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act' 05 in
1933. Chapter 479 identified certain "public works projects" 0 6
as public utilities so as to permit financing under section
66.066. Initially, the financing vehicle was only available for
the identified public works projects undertaken in connection
with the National Industrial Recovery Act.107 In 1939 the statutory language was changed to permit financing of the identified public works projects "whether or not" undertaken in
connection with the National Industrial Recovery Act. 0 8 In
1953 all references to the National Industrial Recovery Act
were eliminated. 0 9
The supreme court has held that projects financed pursuant to section 66.067 are not subject to all of the requirements
of section 66.066. In Meier v. City of Madison,"0 the court
dealt with "hospital revenue bonds" issued under section
66.067. Among other things, it was contended that the city
failed to determine the proportion of revenues to be assigned
to the accounts for operation and maintenance, depreciation,
and debt service. The court held that the language of section
66.067 does not require that all aspects of section 66.066 be
followed, but that there be "compliance with [Section 66.066]
only with respect to the manner in which the funds. . . are to
be raised.""'
Although the supreme court has exhibited a great degree
of flexibility on the question of what constitutes a public utilId. at 559, 259 N.W. at 441.
104. 1933 Wis. Laws ch. 479 evolved into Wis. STAT. § 66.067 (1977).
105. Pub. L. No. 67-90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
106. 1933 Wis. Laws ch. 479 identified the following public works projects: garbage incinerators, toll bridges, swimming pools, tennis courts, parks, playgrounds, golf
links, bathing beaches, bath houses, street lighting, city halls, court houses, jails,
schools, hospitals, and any and all other necessary public works projects undertaken
pursuant to the Federal Act.
107. 1933 Wis. Laws ch. 479 began by stating: "For purposes of financing necessary public works projects under the [National Industrial Recovery Act] .
108. 1939 Wis. Laws ch. 395.
109. 1953 Wis. Laws ch. 540 § 28.
110. 257 Wis. 174, 42 N.W.2d 914 (1950).
111. Id. at 181, 42 N.W.2d at 917.
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ity, it has displayed a tendency toward less flexibility with regard to the purposes for which the section 66.066 financing
tool may be used. In Roberts v. City of Madison11 2 the court
found unconstitutional a law1n 3 which permitted the issuance
of bonds pursuant to the predecessor of section 66.066 for the
purpose of reimbursing a municipality for monies expended
from its general fund or from the proceeds of its general obligation bonds. The court examined the language of the public
utility exception and could not find justification for such "reimbursement" bonds in the terms "purchasing, acquiring,
leasing, constructing, extending, adding to, improving, conducting, controlling, operating or managing a public utility."
It rejected the argument that the bond issue in question fell
within the meaning of "managing." In so doing, the court gave
the term "managing" the very restricted definition of meaning
"no more than the right to create an indebtedness for the purpose of hiring a manager. 1 '1 4 While the court's ultimate holding of unconstitutionality is subject to debate, 11 5 the importance of the decision lies in the court's restricted
interpretation of the purposes for which the public utility exception may be used.
The supreme court's early pronouncements concerning section 66.066 appear to have set rather clear parameters for its
use as it has not been the subject of close judicial scrutiny as a
municipal debt financing vehicle for approximately thirty

112. 250 Wis. 317, 27 N.W.2d 233 (1947).
113. 1935 Wis. Laws ch. 230.
114. 250 Wis. 317, 324, 27 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1947).
115. Justice Fairchild, in a strong dissent, correctly points out that the statutory
authority for the issuance of revenue bonds must be distinguished from the constitutional limitation on municipal indebtedness. That is, the constitution does not prohibit the legislature from permitting a municipality to reimburse itself from funds
already advanced. What it does prohibit is municipal indebtedness beyond 5% of the
full value of all property in that municipality. In this case, the city of Madison would

have exceeded its debt limit if the bonds in question were found to constitute "debt."
The court's finding that the "reimbursement bonds" contemplated were not within
the purposes found in the "public utility" exception does not support the finding that
the statute which authorized such reimbursement bonds was unconstitutional. What
the court's finding does support is that the reimbursement bonds, at least in this fact
situation, would constitute "debt," thus putting the city over the debt limit and, thus
invalidating the issuance of bonds in this circumstance. In effect, what the court held
was that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional because the bonds constituted
debt. The proper holding would appear to have been to uphold the statute but invalidate the bond issue because it caused the city of Madison to exceed its debt limit.
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years." 6 Thus, the law might be characterized as being well
settled in this area. This does not mean, however, that the
existing statute is not without certain limitations. To the contrary, the statute suffers from obsolescence in several respects
which are discussed below.
B.

The Present Statutory Framework: Suggested
Improvements

Certainly, one of the most significant shortcomings of the
statutory as well as the constitutional framework is the failure
to fully integrate counties into the revenue debt financing
scheme. The root of the problem is twofold. First, while counties are given authority to issue revenue bonds for specific or
limited purposes, 1 7 they are not given express 1 8 authority to
issue revenue bonds under section 66.066, which is much
broader in scope considering the liberal definition of public
utility.11 Second, counties are not included in the "public
utility exception" in article XI, section 3 of the constitution.
Unfortunately, too much significance has been attached to
the absence of counties from the public utility exception and
it has led many to the hasty conclusion that it precludes counties from issuing revenue bonds. This is not true. The authority to issue revenue bonds does not rise to constitutional proportions. It is merely a matter of statutory authority as
illustrated above.12 0 The constitutional issue is "indebtedness"
and the impact it has on the structure a revenue bond must
have to avoid being classified as "debt" in the constitutional
sense. The public utility exception relates to the latter issue.

116. See Meier v. City of Madison, 257 Wis. 174, 42 N.W.2d 914 (1950).
117. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 66.51 (certain county buildings); 66.508 (county-city
safety buildings); 66.505(3) (county-city auditoriums); 66.47(3) (county-city hospitals); 30.34-.35 (harbor improvements); 84.135 (interstate toll bridges).
118. Counties are not among the municipal entities authorized to use Wis. STAT. §
66.066. Arguably, counties are authorized directly to utilize § 66.066 by virtue of the
language in § 66.067, which states that for financing purposes, certain public works
projects undertaken by counties are deemed public utilities within the meaning of §
66.066 and that "any indebtedness created under [§ 66.067] may not be included in
arriving at the constitutional debt limitation." The latter statement suggests that §
66.067 is an independent grant of statutory authority to borrow money. If so, counties
have indirect access to § 66.066. Support for this argument is found in Meier v. City
of Madison, 257 Wis. 174, 180, 42 N.W.2d 914, 917 (1950).
119. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
120. See note 117 supra.
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It is an exception to the general rule that debt is created
whenever a municipality's existing assets are encumbered by a
lien as security for a bond issue. The exception is only available to cities, villages, towns and special districts.
The absence of counties from the exception simply means
that they are subject to the general rule and the full impact of
the Wisconsin common law as it relates to the creation of
debt. That is, given proper statutory authority, a county can
issue revenue bonds to construct or acquire a new revenueproducing project and secure the bonds with a mortgage lien
on the project. Furthermore, a county can extend or improve
an existing revenue-producing project with revenue bond proceeds but it cannot place a mortgage lien on the project without encumbering existing county assets and thereby creating
debt.121 If counties had access to the public utility exception a
mortgage lien could be used in the latter situation and debt
would not be created.12 2 The lack of access to the public utility exception, therefore, does not preclude counties from issuing revenue bonds. It does preclude counties from making full
use of a mortgage lien as a means of securing repayment of
the revenue bond.
A constitutional amendment is required to include counties in the public utility exception. However, two relatively
simple statutory changes could make section 66.066 available
to counties, although they would still be denied the benefit of
the public utility exception. First, counties should be specifically authorized to use section 66.066. Given such authority,
counties could use section 66.066 to acquire or construct new
revenue-producing projects. Second, if the mandatory statutory lien requirement were eliminated, counties could use section 66.066 to improve or extend an existing revenue-producing project without creating debt. In other words, without the
mandatory statutory lien the county revenue bonds used for
project extension or improvement would not automatically become "debt" in the constitutional sense. Elimination of the
121. Since counties are not included in the public utility exception they are subject to the holding in State ex rel. Morgan v. City of Portage, 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W.
376 (1921).

122. This assumes that the project acquired or constructed with the revenue bond
proceeds qualifies as a "public utility" - a test with a very low threshold. See Payne
v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935).
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statutory lien would have the added effect of transforming
section 66.066 into a revenue bond statute in the true sense of
the term.123
Elimination of the statutory lien would leave the necessity
of the pledge of a mortgage lien to market considerations. The
limiting factor would be that counties could not voluntarily
use a mortgage lien as security for projects involving extensions or improvements without incurring debt. Such legal restrictions are not uncommon and they are not fatal to the
marketability of the debt instrument.
The absence of counties in both the constitutional and
statutory language can be attributed to the fact that counties
are viewed as units of government with limited purposes and
powers, serving merely as administrative, agencies of the
state. 2 4 It is true that counties lack home rule power in the
traditional sense1 25 and can only exercise those powers conferred by statutory authority.128 However, county powers and
responsibilities have continued to increase in direct response
to the recognized fact that various municipal functions can be
administered and delivered more efficiently by units of government which transcend city, village and town boundaries
such as counties or special districts. Wisconsin counties lag far
27
behind counties in other states in the use of revenue bonds.1
123. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has characterized § 66.066 as a "straight
mortgage bond" statute upon the rationale that the principal security backing the
bond issue is the statutory mortgage lien and not the revenues generated by the enterprise although the revenues may also be pledged as security. See Roberts v. City
of Madison, 250 Wis. 317, 324, 27 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1947). In fact, the debt issued
pursuant to § 66.066 is best described as "mortgage-revenue bonds" since the principal security behind the bond is not only the statutory mortgage lien but the enterprise revenues as well. By eliminating the statutory mortgage lien, § 66.066 would
take on the characteristics of a "straight revenue bond" in that the principal source
of security would be a pledge of the enterprise revenues with any mortgage liens being left to be determined voluntarily as market forces and legal restrictions dictate.
See generally NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL MUNIcIPAL REVENUE BOND LAW
(1958).
124. See Dane County v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 79 Wis. 2d
323, 255 N.W.2d 539 (1977).
125. Wis. CoNsT. art. XI, § 3 grants home rule power only to cities and villages.
Note, however, that "populous" counties may exercise certain home rule powers
under very limited circumstances pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 59.083 (1977).
126. See Dane County v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 79 Wis. 2d
323, 255 N.W.2d 539 (1977).
127. Only 2% of the long-term debt of Wisconsin counties is "non-guaranteed" or
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The time has long since passed for allowing counties full ac128
cess to the section 66.066 financing vehicle.

The limited authority of counties to utilize revenue bonds
is one of the most glaring shortcomings of our revenue bond
mechanism. It can be argued that the entire statute should be
reworked in view of changed municipal needs and circum-

stances. At the very least, however, the remedial changes suggested in the remainder of this section should be addressed by
the legislature so as to remove unnecessary and artificial
impediments.
The requirement that the governing body fix the propor-

tion of revenues generated by the public utility to be allocated
to various funds 129 reduces debt issuance flexibility. An alternative to the specific fund allocation method would be a type
of "flow through" accounting whereby the revenues generated
by the public utility would flow through a designated sequence of accounts and be depleted at each stage. 30 This type
of accounting method would also allow flexibility to create

what is known as a "first Hen" revenue bond.' 3 ' The latter carevenue bond debt This compares to 29% nationwide. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF CoM., FINANCES OF CoUNTY GOVERNMENTS, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS (May 1979).
128. For example, Milwaukee County is charged by statute with funding the capital improvement requests it receives from the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, currently estimated to reach $1.5 billion or more over the next ten years. Since
the county does not have a traditional revenue bond vehicle available to finance these
requests it is faced with the distinct possibility of having to resort to its general obligation borrowing authority and exhausting its general obligation debt limitation
within a very short period of time. See MILWAUKEE COUNTY FINANCIAL ADVISORY
TEAM, FINANCIAL PLAN FOR MILWAUKEE COUNTY, WISCONSIN (September 14, 1979).
129. Wis. STAT. § 66.066(2)(c) (1977) states as follows: As accurately as possible in advance, said board or council shall by
ordinance fix and determine: 1. The proportion of the revenues of such public
utility which shall be necessary for the reasonable and proper operation and
maintenance thereof; 2. The proportion of the said revenues which shall be set
aside as a proper and adequate depreciation fund; and 3. The proportion of the
said revenues which shall be set aside and applied to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds herein authorized and shall set the same aside
in separate funds. At any time after one year's operation, the council or board
may recompute the proportion of the revenues which shall be assignable as
provided above based upon the experience of operation or upon the basis of
further financing.
130. For example, revenues generated could flow into the operation and maintenance account, then to the depreciation account, then to a debt service account and
then to a reserve account. See generally Smith, supra note 17, at 285-98.
131. A "first lien" revenue bond creates a "first lien" on all revenues generated by
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The requirement that section 66.066 bonds cannot be redeemed until three years after the date of the bond issue136
serves little practical purpose since market considerations
137
generally dictate a minimum call of longer than three years.

Thus, to the vast majority of bond issues under section 66.066,
the three-year minimum call feature is not an obstacle. However, the minimum does create a problem in those few instances where circumstances dictate a shorter call period.138
Generally, in those circumstances the shorter call period
serves a legitimate purpose and facilitates the municipal borrower's peculiar needs without the slightest suggestion of
abuse of the borrowing power conferred by section 66.066.
Market forces and the borrower's needs are the proper determinants for a particular bond issue's call feature; an arbitrary
statutory standard should not be imposed. For these reasons,
the three-year minimum call feature requirement should be
eliminated. In addition to the changes already suggested, section 66.066 should be modernized by eliminating the outdated
provisions regarding issuance of mortgage certificates 8 9 and
1 40

stock.

C. Revenue Bonds with Limited Tax Backing
A question which arises with respect to bonds issued pursuant to section 66.066 is to what extent, if any, a municipality may commit its taxing power to support a revenue-producing enterprise without such commitment either causing the
entire bond issue to be considered a "debt" of the municipality or causing "debt" to be created to the extent of the commitment being made. It is not unusual to find a revenue-producing enterprise that may need a subsidy from its parent
136. Wis. STAT. § 66.066(2)(a) (1977).
137. Call features are normally imposed some time after the fifth year depending
on the length of the maturity. See generally Smith, supra note 17, at 202-05.
138. An excellent example of special circumstances which dictate a shorter call
period is the state of the bond market at the time of the drafting of this article.
Interest rates on municipal bonds have soared and there is great uncertainty in the
market. As a consequence, municipal borrowers are structuring their bond issues to
meet the needs of the market. This includes call features as short as two years to

allow the municipal borrower to take advantage of a drop in interest rates should the
market improve in the short term.
139. Wis. STAT. § 66.066(3) (1977).
140. Wis. STAT. § 66.066(4) (1977).
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municipality to make it a viable, going concern. This is especially true in the early years of some enterprises. The issue
which has created some consternation among bond counsel is
what form, if any, the subsidy can take so as to avoid the cre-

ation of "debt."
Essentially what is being sought is an infusion of money
into the enterprise over and above the self-generated revenues. The infusion has taken the form of a payment by the
parent municipality for services provided to it by the enterprise. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized the generally accepted rule that debt is not created by a commitment
to pay for services over a period of years upon the rationale
that the obligation to pay for the service does not arise until
the service is rendered 141 and, if there are sufficient revenues
in the municipal treasury or in the process of collection 14 2 to

pay for the service, no debt would be created. The revenues
generated by such a payment could be applied to offset expenses of the enterprise including debt service. 14

141. The rule was stated by the supreme court in Meier v. City of Madison, 257
Wis. 174, 42 N.W.2d 914 (1950) (quoting Stedman v. Berlin, 97 Wis. 505, 512, 73
N.W. 57, 60 (1897)):
Where a municipality contracts for annual services for a series of years, to be
paid for by annual payments, such contract does not come within such a prohibition. "In such case the whole amount which may ultimately become due does
not constitute a debt, within the meaning of the constitution. To that end,
regard is to be had only to the amount that may become due within a certain
year or other period."
142. This language refers to what has been called the "cash-basis" theory. It is
summarized as follows:
So long as the current expenses of the municipality are kept within the limits
of the moneys and assets actually in the treasury, and the current revenues
collected or in process of immediate collection, the municipality may be fairly
regarded as doing business on a cash basis, and not upon credit, - even
though there may be for a short time some unpaid liabilities. In other words, a
municipality's capacity for doing business on such cash basis, with outstanding
liabilities, is necessarily measured by the amount of cash on hand and the
available assets and resources readily convertible into cash to meet the payment of such liabilities as they become due. But the moment an indebtedness
is voluntarily created "in any manner or for any purpose," with no money or
assets in the treasury, nor current revenues collected or in process of collection
for the payment of the same, that moment such debt must be considered in
determining whether such municipality has or has not exceeded the constitutional limit of indebtedness.
Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, 298, 68 N.W. 964, 968 (1896). For a detailed discussion of
the "cash-basis" theory, see Kiernan, supra note 23, at 197-205.
143. Under the present statutory scheme the payment for services would be dis-
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In contrast to the payment by the parent municipality to
the enterprise for services received, the municipal subsidy has
also taken the form of a payment earmarked for a particular
purpose such as operation and maintenance. 14 4 A commitment
to make a payment such as this was held not to constitute
debt in Meier v. City of Madison, where the city leased a hospital to a private nonprofit association and agreed to pay the
association seventy-five thousand dollars per year for forty
years for the maintenance of the hospital. The court found no
difference between this situation and one where a commitment is made to pay for services rendered and declared that
the commitment did not create debt in the constitutional
sense.
It is claimed that the city's undertaking to pay to the association $75,000 per year for the term of forty years for the
maintenance, etc., of the hospital, creates a present indebtedness of $3,000,000 within the constitutional limitation.
The constitutional provision speaks of indebtedness, not of
contractual obligations. There is no indebtedness except
that which accrues and matures from year to year, and then
only if the association performs as the lease requires. The
obligation does not ripen into an indebtedness until at the
end of each year's performance by the association.145
Thus, it appears clear that a municipality can use its general taxing power to support a revenue-producing enterprise
without creating debt if the commitment is tied to services
rendered to the municipality or tied to the continued performance of obligations by the enterprise pursuant to an
agreement with a municipality. This being the case, there appears to be no legal impediment to an undertaking by the parent municipality to commit funds specifically for the payment
of debt service on revenue bonds issued by the enterprise.
Such a commitment would not constitute debt if it were con-

tributed among the various accounts required by § 66.066 in the proportions as established by the governing body. See notes 129-31, supra. However, if the enterprise
were financed pursuant to § 66.067 the required apportionment would not apply. See
Meier v. City of Madison, 257 Wis. 174, 42 N.W.2d 914 (1950).
144. Arguably such a payment would only be possible under § 66.067 since §
66.066 requires an apportionment of all revenues received between operation and

maintenance, depreciation and debt service. See note 141, supra.
145. 257 Wis. at 183, 42 N.W.2d at 918.
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The commitment of tax dollars, whether it is intended as
an additional revenue source to pay debt service or intended
to meet general expenses, adds to the financial strength of the
enterprise and enhances the security of any revenue bonds
which the enterprise may issue. The added security, in turn,
would enhance the marketability of such a bond issue and, in
all likelihood, reduce its interest cost.
D. Summary
Revenue bonds have not yet played a significant role in
municipal debt finance in Wisconsin., 7 This is likely due to a
number of factors not the least of which is that municipal officials are more comfortable with general obligation debt procedure and are disinclined to use a revenue bond vehicle, particularly if the municipality has adequate debt capacity to
finance a project on a general obligation basis. The tax revolt
climate and the antipathy towards increased property taxation it has engendered may break the natural preference that
exists for general obligation debt financing. Another factor
which may cause more frequent use of revenue bonds in Wisconsin is that over half of the state's municipalities have debt
margins of less than one million dollars. 48 Furthermore,
sound fiscal management policy, at times, dictates that reve-

146. While there is no conceptual distinction between a commitment to pay a sum
certain for maintenance as opposed to a similar payment for debt service, great care
is needed in drafting the language of a commitment to pay debt service. The commitment cannot be made so as to be construed as a pledge of the municipality's full faith
and credit to the payment of debt service with the revenues generated by the enterprise being viewed as merely constituting an offset or reimbursement to the municipality. Rather, the commitment must be to simply contribute to the debt service fund
which constitutes the bondholder's security that principal and interest payments will
be made when due. See Fowler v. City of Superior, 85 Wis. 411, 54 N.W. 800 (1893).
147. Only 25% of the long-term debt of Wisconsin municipalities is
"nonguaranteed" or revenue bond debt. This compares to 41% nationwide. See BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., FINANCES OF MUNICIPALITIES AND TOWNSHIP
GOVERNMENTS, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS (1979).
148. On December 31, 1978, approximately 59% of the towns, villages and cities
in Wisconsin had debt margins of less than one million dollars. Individual percentages were as follows: towns (56%), villages (83%)., and cities (28%). Percentages were
compiled by the authors from statistics found in BUREAU OF LocAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, Wis. DEP'T OF REVENUE, BULL. No. 60, INDEBTEDNESS 1978 (Dec. 1979).
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nue bond financing be utilized instead of general obligation
debt.
This is not to suggest, however, that revenue bond financing should supplant general obligation debt as the primary
source of funds for long-term capital projects. The fact is that
some capital projects do not lend themselves to revenue bond
financing. Revenue bond financing should, however, assume a
more prominent role in those areas to which its use is naturally suited.
The revenue bond provisions embodied in sections 66.066
and 66.067, coupled with the "judicial gloss" of case law interpreting both, offer a practical alternative to traditional general obligation debt. The statutory changes and modes of
structuring identified in this section would add more flexibility and marketability to the existing general purpose revenue bond vehicle. With all indications pointing toward an increased reliance on revenue bonds during the 1980's, the
availability of flexible revenue bond vehicles becomes just that
much more important.
IV. FEDERAL IMPACT
As in many human endeavors, the federal government has
had a growing and often unwelcome impact on municipal debt
financing. Until recently its role had been restrained. The relative absence of federal regulation of the municipal debt market distinguishes municipal from private sector capital formation. The salient features of governmental restraint have been
the tax-exempt characteristic of interest paid on municipal
obligations and the exemption municipal securities enjoy from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933149
(1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934150 (1934
Act).
Clearly, federal restraint has facilitated municipal debt
financing. As is discussed below, the role of the federal government as facilitator was born of political necessity. In recent
years, however, the Treasury has rigorously pursued the role
of regulator of the municipal market. Moreover, recent munic149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh
(1976).
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ipal insolvency has inspired the Securities and Exchange
Commission and others to urge Congress to enact new and
far-reaching controls over the municipal market. The result of
these developments has been a profound change in municipal
debt financing practices that has affected Wisconsin, as well
as every other state.
A.

The Federal Tax Exemption

The most significant difference between public and private
sector debt financing is that interest paid on certain municipal obligations is exempt from federal income taxation. Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides, in
part:
a) General Rule.
Gross income does not include interest on (1) The obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District of
Columbia .... 151
It is this provision which created a municipal market separate
and distinct from the private sector debt market.
For the issuing municipality, the effect of the tax exemption has been a substantial savings on the interest cost of borrowed money. Municipal securities have generally sold at
lower yields than taxable securities of similar quality and maturity. The long-term tax-exempt interest rates were at sixtyone percent of the taxable rate in 1979 and short-term taxexempt rates were a remarkable forty-six per cent of the taxa152
ble rate for comparable obligations that year.
For the investor, the value of the tax exemption depends
on the level of his taxable income. Tax-exempt investment by
commercial banks, institutional investors and wealthy individuals has historically proved to be a safe and relatively high
yielding investment.
For the federal government, however, the tax-exempt feature has resulted in the loss of potential revenues. Therein lies

151. I.R.C. § 103(a).
152. See Kalita, The Federal Assault on the Tax Exemption, Daily Bond Buyer,

March 5, 1980, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Kalita].
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the rub. As state and local governments have broadened their
view of what constitutes a public purpose, the magnitude of
municipal indebtedness has grown. While the exemption may
once have been reluctantly accepted as a burden of federalism, the Treasury now views it as an ineffective federal subsidy which must be curbed.
The issue of whether or not interest paid on state and municipal securities would be subject to federal income taxation
was a significant factor in the debate over the sixteenth
amendment. 153 Opponents of the amendment cited its application to income "from whatever source derived" as a clear
threat to municipal securities. 1 " When the sixteenth amendment was ratified, the issue had not been resolved. Accordingly, when the first income tax legislation following the
amendment was being enacted, Representative Cordell Hull,
sponsor of the bill in the House, "explained that in order to
avoid any constitutional question, the bill contained the provision . . that there should be excluded from taxable gross
income 'interest upon the obligations of a State . . .or any
political subdivision thereof.' ,,155 The exemption, as enacted,

has remained virtually unchanged through numerous successive re-enactments,156 despite the Treasury's periodic efforts
to modify or abolish it over the last sixty years. 57
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The sixteenth amendment provided Congress with
the power to levy a federal income tax as follows: "The Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the States, and without regard to any census of enumeration."
154. See Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d ,998, 1012 (2d Cir. 1944)
(dissenting opinion). See also Lent, The Origin and Survival of Tax-Exempt Securities, 12 NAT'L TAX J. 301, 303-04 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Lent].
155. Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998, 1012 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion).
156. See Fox v. United States, 397 F.2d 119, 121 n.4 (8th Cir. 1968) which enumerated the following successive reenactments:
Section 4 of the Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 756); Section 213(b)(4) of
the Revenue Acts of 1918 (c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057), 1921 (c. 136, 42 Stat. 227), 1924
(c. 234, 43 Stat. 253) and 1926 (c. 27, 44 Stat. 9); Section 22(b)(4) of the Revenue Acts of 1928 (c. 852, 45 Stat. 791), 1932 (c. 209, 47 Stat. 169), 1934 (c. 277,
48 Stat. 680), 1936 (c. 690, 49 Stat. 1648) and 1938 (c. 280, 52 Stat. 447), and
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
157. See Lent, supra note 154. See also Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal
Bond Interest - "InterestingSpeculation" and One Step Forward,44 NoTRE DAbs
LAW. 191, 203 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Martori & Bliss]; Comment, The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest by the FederalGovernment, 38 U. Cm. L. Rv.
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There has been considerable litigation respecting the
breadth of "obligations" which would enjoy tax-exempt status. The taxing authorities argue that only those obligations
incurred in the exercise of governmental borrowing should
qualify for the exemption. The courts have consistently
agreed and have made clear that the purpose of the exemption was simply to facilitate loans in aid of government programs. In Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 158 the
United States Supreme Court stated:
It is clear from a consideration of the entire section and of
the subject matter that the purpose of Congress, in thus excluding from gross income interest upon such obligations,
was to aid the borrowing power of the Federal government
by making its interest-bearing bonds more attractive to investors. The scope of the word "obligations" as there employed must be narrowed accordingly, and not extended to
include interest upon indebtedness not incurred under the
borrowing power.... 1s5
While the foregoing case considered whether interest paid on
a federal income tax refund would enjoy tax exemption, the
same reasoning has been applied to state and local
obligations.1 6 0
The above analysis goes to the nature of obligations which
enjoy the exemption. It does not resolve the issue which arose
at the inception of the exemption, namely, whether or not the
exemption has constitutional underpinnings. Proponents of
the constitutional theory begin with McCulloch v. Maryland""" and Collector v. Day,1 2 but rely on Pollock v.
703 (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest].
158. 293 U.S. 84 (1934).

159. Id. at 87 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
160. See, e.g., Drew v. United States, 551 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that

interest paid to land owners on condemnation awards or settlements was not an interest payment on obligations within the meaning of section 103 of the Code); Holley v.
United States, 124 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1942); United States Trust Co. v. Anderson, 65
F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1933). Similarly, Fox v. United States, 397 F.2d. 119, 121 n.4 (8th

Cir. 1968) held that interest paid on certificates of deposit by a state-owned bank was
not tax exempt.
161. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall concluded that in

order to preserve the federal system, the federal and state governments must have
reciprocal immunity from the power to tax each other's instrumentalities. His celebrated quote is: "the power to tax involves the power to destroy .... " 17 U.S. at

436.
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Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.163 Pollock declared unconstitutional the Revenue Act of 1894, which had attempted to impose an income tax on the interest from municipal bonds. The
Court found no distinction between a tax on the income from
such bonds and a tax on the bonds themselves. This caused
the Court to conclude that the tax violated the doctrine of
reciprocal immunity. Although the decision has been attenuated by later decisions, which caused modern commentators
to question the constitutional basis for the exemption,1 ' Pollock has never been specifically overruled. While the existence
of section 103 has precluded meaningful judicial consideration
of the constitutional question, this may change in view of the
growing aggressiveness of the Treasury in attempting to narrow the exemption. The Public Securities Association' 5 has
urged that the doctrine of reciprocal immunity be resurrected
and interposed as a constitutional challenge to Treasury activity restricting the exemption.1 66
It is submitted that the Treasury's perception of the exemption as a magnanimous federal gesture rather than as a
requirement of federalism has fostered and encouraged federal scrutiny of the nature and quantity of state and local borrowing. The Treasury's inclination in this regard was made
painfully clear in 1968 in a prophetic speech by Stanley S.
Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before the
Municipal Forum of New York. In justifying the Treasury's
attack on so-called "arbitrage bonds" and industrial revenue
bonds, Surrey stated:
We are all aware of the importance to State and local govermnents of the stability of the municipal bond market.
Given this importance, it is an interesting fact, to say the
least, that it is the Treasury Department in the last few
years which has had to undertake the responsibility of pro162. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). In holding the salary of a state judge immune
from federal income taxation the Court applied the McCulloch reasoning to limit federal taxing power.
163. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
164. See, e.g., Martori & Bliss and The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest, supra note 157.
165. The Public Securities Association is a national trade association representing
municipal securities dealers and dealer banks which provide underwriting and
financial advisory services for state and local governments.
166. See, e.g., Kalita, supra note 152.
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tecting that market from instabilities being generated by
State and local governments themselves. 6 '
Surrey went on to discuss municipal bonds as revenue which
the Treasury loses. He cited a "bond explosion" which
was also having its effect on Treasury revenues. Under projected rates of growth, the Treasury would by 1970 be losing
revenue at the rate of $200 million a year. This loss would
rise rapidly as the volume of outstanding issues accumulated, so that it is estimated that five years later, in 1975,
the annual loss would be $1 billion. 6 8
Thus, it is clear that the Treasury regards itself as protector
of the municipal market and evaluates the exemption in terms
of its effectiveness as a federal subsidy. The impact of this
attitude on state and local debt financing can be seen upon
briefly considering the curtailment of industrial revenue
bonds and the Treasury Regulations on arbitrage.
1.

Industrial Revenue Bonds.

Surrey's speech came at a time when the Treasury was extremely alarmed by the proliferation of industrial development bonds.16 9 At the time of his speech, approximately forty
states had authorized the issuance of industrial revenue bonds
in some form. Obviously, by adopting an industrial development bond statute, a state would be concluding that such
bonds were lawful debt "obligations" serving a public purpose.
Interestingly enough, several Revenue Rulings bolstered this
conclusion. 170 It can be argued that it was not until the vehicle
proliferated and, in the Treasury's view, constituted a growing
drain on federal revenues, that the Treasury began to reassess
its position. Treasury Information Release 972,'17 dated
March 6, 1968, announced that the Treasury was reconsidering its position on the applicability of the exemption to "socalled industrial development bonds" because the debtor, in

167. Surrey, Tax Trends and Bond Financing, 22 TAX LAW. 123, 123-24 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Surrey].
168. Id. at 126.
169. Id. at 125.
170. Rev. Rul. 20, 1963-1 C.B. 24; Rev. Rul. 187, 1957-1 C.B. 65; Rev. Rul. 106,
1954-1 C.B. 28.
171. [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX RFP. (CCH) 6648.
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reality, was a private corporation which used the facilities
constructed with the proceeds of the bond issue. 17 21 Hearings
on proposed regulations followed shortly, and the tax exemption on industrial development bonds was substantially withdrawn by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.171
It is interesting to note that Wisconsin's industrial development revenue bond statute 7 4 was considered and enacted
in the same period during which the Treasury was persuading
Congress to curtail the exemption for industrial revenue
bonds. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the public purpose and constitutionality of such bonds in State ex rel. Ham17 5
Thus, our legislature and
mermill Paper Co. v. La Plante.
supreme court have determined that industrial revenue bonds
are municipal obligations which serve a public purpose. Nevertheless, Congress has determined that such bonds, despite
their conformity with the broad language of section 103(a) of
the Code, will enjoy tax exemption in only limited circumstances. This has had the impact of thwarting industrial development in Wisconsin and other states that did not implement the industrial revenue bond vehicle prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. Furthermore, the Treasury is seeking to
17
restrict the use of industrial revenue bonds even further. 1 If
successful, this could have a dramatic impact on Wisconsin's
industrial and urban development in the 1980's.
2.

Arbitrage

The current federal arbitrage regulations17 7 have had, perhaps, the most profound federal impact on Wisconsin's state
and local debt issuance and management. The regulations affect the purpose, size and timing of issues. Moreover, the regulations restrict municipal authority to establish and manage
sinking and reserve funds.
As a general proposition, arbitrage is the practice of ac-

172. Id.
173. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 (codified at scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act of 1969].
174. Wis. STAT. § 66.521 (1977).
175. 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973).
176. See Daily Bond Buyer, May 6, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
177. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.103-13 to 1.103-15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Final Arbitrage Regulations].
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quiring property in one market and disposing of it in another
for the purpose of profiting from the difference in price between the two markets. 178 In the context of municipal securities, the term applies to the difference between interest paid
by the municipality to the holders of securities and the interest earned on investment of the proceeds from the sale of the
securities. For example, in today's market a municipality paying eight per cent interest to bondholders could invest the
principal of the issue by acquiring virtually riskless securities
(e.g., taxable obligations of the United States) that may yield
twelve per cent interest to the municipality. The bonds would
be fully secured by the acquired obligations, the municipality
would pay no income tax on its earnings, and the bondholders
would pay no income tax on the interest paid to them. If one
adds to the formula the factor that the acquired obligations
could be paid into a sinking fund in a manner which defeased
the bond issue for purposes of debt limitation, there would be
no size or frequency of issuance limit on the practice.
In 1966 the Treasury began to curtail what it considered to
be widespread issuance of arbitrage bonds. 17 9 Few would argue
that no restraints were necessary. Widespread issuance of
arbitage bonds could saturate and destroy the tax-exempt
market.180 But still fewer anticipated the magnitude and reach
of the Treasury regulations that evolved. Congress eliminated
the tax exemption for interest on "arbitrage bonds" as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.181 Pursuant to the new legislation, a series of temporary and proposed regulations were in
effect 182 until the Treasury adopted "Final Arbitrage Regula-

178. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 95 (5th ed. 1979).
179. See generally Ritter, An Analysis of the New ProposedRegulations on Arbitrage Bonds Under Section 103(d), 37 J. TAx. 164 (1972).
180. See Surrey, supra note 164, at 124-25.
181. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 601(a) which created subsection (d)of Section
103 of the Internal Revenue Code. Subsection (d) was later relettered as subsection
(c). Pub. Law No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(17)(B), 90 Stat. 1766.
182. In 1972, the Treasury gave notice of its position that proposed regulations in
this area may be effective prior to their adoption as final regulations:
Taxpayers, issuers, and their counsel are cautioned that they may not rely on
the provisions of final or temporary regulations after publication of a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making which, if finally adopted, will change or supercede the
provisions of those regulations effective with the date of the Notice on a later
date as specified in the Notice.
Treas. Dep't News Release (Nov. 13, 1972), [1972] 7 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) I
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tions" on May 31, 1979.183 A full understanding of the current

regulations requires an understanding of their evolution, but
such an analysis would far exceed the scope of this article.
Our purpose here is to discuss the impact of the current regulations on Wisconsin municipal debt financing.
a. Restrictions on Investment of the Proceeds of Securities
Issues for Construction of New Facilities
Section 103(c) and the temporary, proposed and Final Arbitrage Regulations promulgated thereunder provide that
money borrowed on a tax-exempt basis may not be invested in
taxable securities at a "materially higher" yield.' "Materially
higher" is currently defined as an investmentoyield one-eighth
of one per cent higher than the interest the issuer is paying on
the municipal obligations. 185 Statutory exemptions for "temporary periods" and reasonably required reserves were provided to insulate certain traditional municipal financial practices from arbitrage restrictions (e.g., the investment of bond
proceeds during a construction period or the maintenance of a
debt service reserve fund). 86 The current regulations provide
a temporary period for new money issues during which bond
or note proceeds may be invested at unrestricted yields if the
following criteria are met:
1. Within six months after the date of issue of the government obligations, the issuer must incur a substantial binding
obligation to commence or acquire the project;"8"
2. After a substantial binding obligation to commence or
acquire the project is incurred, work on or acquisition of the
project must proceed with due diligence to completion; 18
3. An amount equal to eighty-five per cent of spendable
proceeds must be expended on the project within three
6974.
183. See Final Arbitrage Regulations, supra note 174 (TD 7627, filed 5/31/79).
The use of "Final" inthe title of the Regulations is, perhaps, a reflection of the Treasury's sensitivity to criticism regarding the prolonged and tortuous nine years of temporary and proposed regulations.

184. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(A), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.103-13(a)(1), 1.103-13(b)(5)
(1979).
185.
186.
187.
188.

Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5) (1979).
See generally F. BALLAID, XYZ's OF
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(b)(3) (1979).
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(b)(4) (1979).
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(1979).
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years of the date of issue;189 and,
4. The proceeds cannot exceed by more than five percent
the anticipated cost of the project.' 90
In addition, the project purchased with the proceeds should
not be sold or otherwise disposed of prior to the last maturity
of the securities.' 9 1 While these standards are not unduly onerous, they do limit issuer flexibility with respect to the timing and size of issues.
b. Restrictions on Investment of Proceeds of Tax
Anticipation or Revenue Anticipation Borrowing
Many Wisconsin municipalities find it necessary to use tax
or revenue anticipation borrowing because tax revenues and
state aids are not received until well into their fiscal year. The
temporary period for restricted investment of the proceeds is
set forth separately in the regulations. 19 2 In essence, proceeds
may be invested for a thirteen-month temporary period provided that the amount of the financing does not exceed the
"maximum anticipated cumulative cash flow deficit."' 9 Cumulative cash flow deficit is the amount at any time during
the year by which expenditures since the beginning of the
year plus a reasonable cash balance exceed the revenues to
that date together with other available funds. Thus, these regulations limit the amount as well as the duration of such borrowing if any proceeds are to be invested at materially higher

yields.
c.

Yield Limitation on Sinking Fund Investments

Prior to the proposed arbitrage regulations announced in
May 9 4 and September 19 5 of 1978, taxes or revenues held in a
sinking fund could be invested at an unrestricted yield be189. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(b)(2) (1979).
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5)(iv) (1979).
191. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(2)(iv), 38 Fed. Reg. 10,945 (1973). While
the Final Regulations do not mention this certification, the industry practice, based
upon the long-standing proposed regulation, is to include this certification in the
standard arbitrage certificate.
192. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(c)(i) (1979).
193. Id.
194. 43 Fed. Reg. 19,675 (1978).
195. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,822 (1978).
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cause they were not deemed to be proceeds of a tax-exempt
issue. Taking advantage of this, issuers would sell long-term
bonds with principal payments scheduled as late as possible.
The taxes or revenues which normally would have been used
to retire bonds currently were, instead, deposited into a sinking fund which would be used to retire bonds at maturity. The
amounts paid into such a sinking fund were not proceeds and
therefore could be invested at an unrestricted yield for long
periods of time. This would either result in positive cash flow
to the municipality or serve as a means to reduce net borrowing costs. The Wisconsin sinking fund statute permits such an
arrangement. 196
As the practice spread, the Treasury responded in the 1978
amendments by providing that all amounts, regardless of
source, held in a sinking fund for an issue (as well as receipts
from the investment of such amounts) were to be treated as
proceeds of the issue. The Final Arbitrage Regulations 19 7 embody this concept and apply restrictions on sinking fund investment yield unless the sinking fund qualifies under the reserve fund,198 minor portion, 99 or special temporary period
rules. 200
Yield restrictions on sinking funds met with vocal opposition from state and local governments as well as municipal
participants.201 It was argued that the regulations exceeded
the scope of section 103 and impinged on traditional
municipal financing arrangements where an accumulation of
196. Wis.

STAT. § 67.11 (1977).
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(g) (1979).
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(b)(13) (1979).
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(1) (1979).
200. Tress. Reg. § 1.103-14(b)(10) and 1.103-14(b)(12) (1979). The former Regula-

tion permits a thirteen-month temporary period for amounts contributed to a "bona
fide debt service fund" defined therein as a fund "used primarily to achieve proper
matching of revenues and debt service within each bond year" which must be depleted at least once a year except for a carry-over amount equal to the greater of one
year's income of the fund or one-twelfth of annual debt service. The latter regulation
permits a sinking fund for a new money issue to have a temporary period beginning
the date of issue and ending on the first call date, provided that 1) the first call date
is not more than ten years after the issue date, and 2) the issuer "makes a reasonable
effort to schedule payment of as much debt service as is practicable in each year
before the first call date."
201. See, e.g., The Public Securities Association's comments on the proposed
amendments of May 8, 1978 to the arbitrage regulations, submitted to the Internal
Revenue Service in a letter dated June 28, 1978.
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taxes and. other revenue was necessary to comply with legal
requirements or meet practical needs.2 02 At the very least, the
sinking fund rules have enormously complicated the task of
complying with the arbitrage regulations. Any monies that
might be used directly or indirectly to pay principal of or interest on an issue are potential sinking fund proceeds of the
issue. As a result the issuer's accounting system must be
designed to ensure that, during the entire term of the issue,
all accumulated monies and current receipts other than the
proceeds themselves either are not expected to be used to pay
debt service, are entitled to an exemption to be used to pay
debt service, are entitled to an exemption from yield restriction or are restricted in yield. Such an undertaking burdens
the accounting system of large Wisconsin municipalities and
is often beyond the capability of small municipalities.
Unless a municipality is willing to forego investment of
bond or note proceeds before devotion to a project, the Final
Arbitrage Regulations make debt management much more
complicated, expensive and risky than it had been in the past.
Expense is added by the need for financial advisors, experienced bond counsel and sophisticated accounting techniques
for even small transactions. Risk is added because failure to
comply with the regulations could result in the Internal Revenue Service determining an issue to be arbitrage bonds. This
would subject the interest payments to taxation and would
disqualify the issuer from issuing tax-exempt securities without prior approval by the Internal Revenue Service.20 3 If an
issue loses tax-exempt status, the municipality could be exposed to enormous liability. Moreover, the Internal Revenue
Service will publish a notice of disqualification which will
blacken the name. of the issuer and make the sale of future
issues more difficult and expensive.
B.

Securities Law Exemptions

As discussed above, the exemption from federal income
taxation for interest paid on municipal obligations is the most
significant difference between public and private capital formation. The other salient element of federal restraint from
202. Id.
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(2)(iv) (1979).
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regulation of the municipal market is the exemption municipal securities enjoy from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933°4 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.205 Municipal securities have never been exempt from the
anti-fraud provisions of section 17 of the 1933 Act20 8 and section 10 of the 1934 Act.20 7
The 1933 Act requires that the issuer file a registration
statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and make a prospectus available to prospective pur208
chasers before securities are distributed to the public.
These documents must disclose: the identity and remuneration of the directors, principal officers and underwriters of the
issuer; the identity and holdings of major stockholders; the
recent financial statements and material contracts of the issuer; the proposed use of the funds to be acquired through the
issue; underwriting agreements; and other material informa204. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh
(1976).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976). Section 17 of the 1933 Act provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or
indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
c) The exemptions provided in section 77c of this title shall not apply
to the provisions of this section.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
208. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(b) (1976).
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tion relating to the issuer.20 9 The 1934 Act requires securities
exchanges and over-the-counter brokers and dealers to register with the SEC, and regulates business practices in the securities industry.
Municipal securities are exempted from the registration
and prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act.21 0 Similarly,
municipal securities are exempted from the full application of
the 1934 Act.2 11 The expressed rationale for these exemptions
was that there had been only rare instances of municipal misrepresentation and that the principal purchasers of municipal
securities were usually sophisticated investors deemed capable
of looking out for themselves.2 1 2 Beyond this rationale, however, were "obvious political reasons" ' for exemption. Subjecting municipal issuers to the 1933 and 1934 Acts would
have increased the cost of municipal fund raising. Imposing
regulations could have resulted in considerable political opposition to both Acts. Hence, exemptions from federal regulation
were born of political necessity.
In the years following enactment, abuses occurred and pe209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (1976).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970). Section 3 of the 1933 Act provides:
(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(2) Any security issued or guaranteed . . . by any State of the
United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one or more States or
territories...
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1976) provides:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires(12) The term "exempted security" or "exempted securities" includes . . . municipal securities ...
(29) The term "municipal securities" means securities which are
direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or
interest by, a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision
thereof, or any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or
more States ....
212. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Landis]. See also Note, Municipal
Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Bonds and the
Federal Securities Laws].
213. See Landis, supra note 212.
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riodic SEC anti-fraud enforcement actions were undertaken.214 But legislative proposals to regulate trading practices
and require greater issuer disclosure have fallen victim to the
unnecessary federal-intrusion argument. The political winds
began to change, however, with New York City's financial crisis in 1975.215 Municipal investors began demanding more ex-

tensive disclosure from municipal issuers. More significantly,
persuasive evidence was being compiled which indicated that
the apparent abuses of some issuers were resulting in fewer
market participants, greater issuance cost and higher interest
rates for all municipal issuers." ' The initial response of Congress was to create a comprehensive mechanism for self-regulation by municipal securities brokers and dealers. In 1975,
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board was created as an
independent, self-regulatory body charged with primary responsibility for developing rules for the municipal securities
industry, subject to the general overseeing of the SEC. 217 At

the same time, legislation was introduced in both houses of
congress to increase the regulation of municipal security issuance.2"8 In response to growing concern over increased issuer
expense, inflated interest rates, and the specter of extensive
federal regulation, the Municipal Finance Officers Association
accelerated the development of the voluntary Disclosure
Guidelines for State and Local Governments (Guidelines).21 9
214. See Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Law, supra note 212, at
586.
215. See Smith, supra note 17, at 322-23.
216. See Comment, FederalRegulation of Municipal Securities:A Constitutional
and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1261, 1262 [hereinafter cited as Federal
Regulations].
217. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. See
Wallison, Self-Regulation of the Municipal Securities Industry, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 289
(1979); Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board: A New Concept of SelfRegulation, 29 VAND. L. Ray. 903 (1976).
218. The principal legislation consisted of two bills, S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) and S. 2969, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976). Senate Bill 2574 called for the withdrawal of the exemption for municipal securities in the 1933 Act. Senate Bill 2969 did
not disturb the exemption but would have established requirements for offerings in
excess of $5 million as well as an annual reporting requirement for municipalities
with an outstanding indebtedness exceeding $50 million during any portion of a fiscal
year. See generally Federal Regulation, supra note 216, at 1263, and Note, Federal
Regulation of Municipal Securities:DisclosureRequirements and Dual Sovereignty,
86 YALE L.J. 919, 930 (1977).

219. See note 1, supra.
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The Guidelines are considerably less stringent than the prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act. The Guidelines do,
however, require that the issuer disclose: the securities being
offered; the nature of the issuer (or enterprise in the case of
revenue bonds); the issuer's debt structure; the financial practices and recent results of the issuer's operations; recent issuer
financial statements; pertinent legal matters (e.g., pending litigation, a summary of the approving legal opinion, tax status
of the securities); and, miscellaneous information such as municipal bond ratings, the interests of persons associated with
preparation of the official statement and basic provisions of
the authorizing resolutions and governing documents.2 2 0
While the Guidelines are inadequate in certain respects,2 21
their promulgation and issuer's general compliance have effectively blunted the initial movement toward federal disclosure
or registration requirements. But advocates for mandatory registration and disclosure requirements remain 222 and will expand their following as the list of municipalities in financial
distress grows.
Municipal debt issuance in Wisconsin has been profoundly
affected by growing disclosure concerns on the part of issuers,
market participants and bond counsel. Certainly, disclosure
now occurs in more quantity, if not quality. Less than ten
years ago many general obligation bonds were issued and underwritten with little or no disclosure information. When
used, offering circulars often involved only several pages of
basic information. By contrast, when general obligation issues
are now offered at public sale, an official statement is almost

220. Id.
221. For'example, the Guidelines provide little, if any, direction as to disclosure in
the important area of labor relations. Personnel related costs have been a significant
factor in recent municipal fiscal crises. In Wisconsin these costs often comprise 60%
to 80% of the annual budget. More significantly, these costs are recurring costs which
can be tantamount to long-term obligations. See Mulcahy & Schilling, The Impact of
Labor Relations on MunicipalFinance, in MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS IN WISCONSIN
(C. Mulcahy ed. 1979); Mulcahy & Schilling, How Public Labor Relations Impact on
Municipal Credit, Daily Bond Buyer, Dec. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
222. Perhaps the most noted advocate of mandatory registration and disclosure
requirements is Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of New Jersey who was the principal sponsor of S. 2969, supra note 18. Senator Williams also introduced S. 2339, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) which was similar in many respects to S. 2969 but which also
failed to be enacted into law. See also Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: Disclosure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty, 86 YALE L.J. 919.
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always prepared and frequently involves audited financial
statements and thirty to forty pages of disclosure information.
As this trend continues, it affects smaller and smaller issues.
As a practical matter it results in significant issuance expense
for even the smallest issue. The expense must be incurred because the marketplace now expects both comprehensive official statements and an approving legal opinion by recognized
bond counsel on almost every bond issue.
C.

Summary

Municipal access to credit markets has been greatly facilitated by federal governmental regulatory restraint. This restraint, whether based on reasoned exception or political necessity, is currently under severe attack. It is clear that the
Treasury will attempt to brake local government's expanding
view of what constitutes a public purpose. The Treasury will
continue to evaluate what state and local governments declare
to be municipal obligations (i.e., eligible for tax exemption) by
applying its cost-benefit view of federally subsidizing the activity. This approach will continue until Congress curbs the
Treasury's regulatory practices or the courts determine
whether the doctrine of reciprocal immunity and tax exemption based on that doctrine are mandated under the
Constitution.
With respect to municipal disclosure, it is readily apparent
that elimination of the exemption from federal securities law
regulation would have a dramatic impact on municipal debt
finance. The argument is persuasive that the cost of such regulation would far outweigh the benefit of curbing the few
abuses that may occur.
V. CONCLUSION

In the area of municipal debt financing, a clear trend has
developed toward more frequent use of revenue obligations to
meet municipal capital needs which had traditionally been
met with general obligation debts. At the same time, definitions of the public purposes for which municipalities may incur indebtedness are expanding significantly.
The statutory changes suggested herein could serve to provide Wisconsin municipalities with additional procedural and
substantive flexibility in debt financing, thereby better ena-
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bling them to meet the new and expanding capital requirements of the 1980's. Efforts to provide greater flexibility could
be thwarted, however, by expanding federal regulation of the
municipal debt marketplace. In particular, the boldness of the
Treasury Department and the use of its regulatory power will
have a growing impact on municipal debt financing and could
well spark a constitutional debate resulting in dramatic
changes in municipal capital formation.

